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Abstract 
Using 214 observations from data collected on 15 State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Indonesian that have been 
partially privatized from year 1991 to 2007, the research employs Wilcoxon signed-rank test to assess the impact 
of partial privatization on the performance of these firms. It uses panel regression to investigate the factors 
affecting the success or failure of privatization. 
Unlike what mainstream theories propose and what most empirical studies report, given Indonesian context, this 
paper finds that privatization positively affect the performance of partial privatized SOEs in almost all of the 
performance measures employed, both in the short term and long term period. Further investigation also reveals 
that residual state ownership has negative effect all the time, while the positive impact of the number of 
government commissioners tend to decrease; on the other hand the favorable impact of independent 
commissioner has a tendency to be greater in the long term. Externally, although the magnitude of the 
contribution is very marginal in comparison with other predictors, the positive impact of the size of stock market 
also continues to grow along  time.  
The government commitment to improve the performance of privatized SOEs through better monitoring and 
adequate incentive plan and the development of capital market appear to be key success of privatization case in 
Indonesia. This paper suggests that, the gradual and partial Indonesian privatization can be an alternative model 
for other developing countries across the world.  
Keywords:  Partial Privatization, Performance, Indonesia, State-Owned Enterprises  
 
1. Introduction 
The most fundamental question having ever addressed after implementation of privatization policy is whether 
ongoing privatization would be really effective for improving the performance of privatized enterprises as aimed 
at by the policy makers or not. Such question is undeniably important for SOEs stakeholders in order to evaluate 
the existing practice of privatization, then to formulate more precise implementation strategy for the future. 
Given Indonesian context, the issue becomes more relevant because privatization has unique characteristics in 
the sense that it has been gradually and partially pursued. Many studies, both theoretically and empirically, report 
that partial privatization is likely to be less effective in boosting performance in comparison with full 
privatization. 
Privatization is a multifaceted program with multiple objectives. However, from a micro perspective, the main 
and most fundamental objective of privatization is to increase the performance of the divested firms (Vickers and 
Yarrow 1991). This paper is aimed to assess the impact of partial privatization on the performance of privatized 
SOEs, and then to investigate the determining factors of the success or failure of privatization in Indonesia. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the result of our literature survey on 
this issue. Data and methodology are explained in section 3. Empirical result  
is presented in section 4, then, our analysis and discussion is described in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Public firms are perceived to be ill-governed, less efficient, lacking  transparency and underperforming 
compared to their counterpart in the private sector. Many studies have been undertaken to identify the causes of 
poor performance associated with public ownership of enterprises compared to their private counterparts. 
According to its source, the problem plaguing SOEs can be categorized into two groups, namely: internal 
governance problem and external governance problem (Hit, et.al, 2005). Internal governance problem 
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incorporates several problems undelying  companies such as ill-defined and poorly-monitored objectives due to 
the presence of complex agency problem (agency problem theory by Arrow, 1986), overwhelming political 
interference and futile rent seeking activities due to the presence of conflicting interests among several involving 
parties (public choice theory by Buchanan, 1972 and Tullock, 1965), managers’ moral hazard as an impact of 
soft budget constraint effect (soft budget constraint theory by Kornai, 1980), and lack of incentive to control due 
to the presence of dispersed/diffused ownership (property right theory by Jensen & Meckling, 1976). On the 
other hand, external governance problem refers to the absence of constructive pressure from stock market 
expected to discipline inefficient manager’s behavior through stock price signaling mechanism (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). 
Theoretically, there is no other way but full privatization, which is selling state stock with control relinquishment 
from the state to private owners, through stock market, to be considered as the most effective way of curing the 
existing problem in the public enterprises. It is basically a transfer of control from multi-agents with multifaceted 
goals to private owners with single concern of profit maximization. It is obviously able to eliminate all potential 
problems triggered by political interference. On the other hand, partial privatization which is defined as selling 
of state ownership without transfer of control from the state to private owners has been perceived to have a little 
impact on the performance of newly divested SOEs. Besides, it doesn’t get rid of the main problem of political 
engagement; the success of partial privatizations relies considerably on the level of market discipline provided 
by the stock market (Gupta, 2005).  
Empirically, there have been numerous studies revealing the superiority of full privatization over the partial one. 
D’Souza, et al (2005) found in their study over a sample of 129 share-issue privatizations from 23 developed 
(OECD) countries. The same conclusion is also reported by Boubakri et.al (2005) in their research toward a 
sample of 230 firms from 32 developing countries. The same finding was also reported by country specific 
studies, such as in Malaysia (Sun and Tong, 2002). In contrast, very few studies report the success story of 
partial privatization. Given very well established capital market, Gupta (2005) found the favorable impact of the 
partial privatization in India. 
Given the special context of Indonesia in which institutional development, specifically capital market, has been 
less developed in comparison with developed countries, is it possible for partial privatization to work 
satisfactorily? If it is possible, what is the secret behind  such success that other developing countries intending 
to adopt partial privatization could learn from favorably? Since there are very few studies  that show how 
partial privatization may still work successfully in developing country, this study would contribute significantly 
to the body of knowledge.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
We confine our analysis to partial privatization in which the state still holds more than 50% of remaining shares 
after privatization. The government of Indonesia basically has been adopting this type of privatization because 
out of 16 divested SOEs from 1991 to 2007 only PT Indosat divested more than 50%. In this study we include all 
of those 15 partially divested SOEs. To get a clear-cut understanding of privatization impact, we include only 
original SOEs which are initially fully owned by the state, excluding privatization of the former bailed-out 
private firms. The list of privatized SOEs is as shown in the following Table 1. 
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Table 1. List of Partially Privatized SOEs taken in the analysis 
No SOE Sectors 
Year of Privatization and 
Share Sold 
Residual 
State 
Share
s 
First Time 
Privatizatio
n Method 
1 PT Semen Gresik Cement 1991 (25%), 1998 (14%) 51.0% IPO 
2 PT Tambang 
Timah 
Mining 1995 (35%) 65.0% IPO 
3 PT Telkom Telecommunicatio
n 
1995 (23%), 1999 (9.62%), 
2001 (11.9%), 2002 
(3.1%) 
51.2% IPO 
4 PT BNI  Banking 1996 (25%), 2007 (26.3%), 
2010 (3.1%) 
60.0% IPO 
5 PT Aneka 
Tambang 
Mining 1997 (35%) 65.0% IPO 
6 PT Kimia Farma Pharmacy 2001 (9.2%) 90.8% IPO 
7 PT Indofarma 
Tbk  
Pharmacy 2001 (19.8%) 80.2% IPO 
8 PT TABA  Mining 2002 (16.26%), 2004 
(12.5%) 
65.0% IPO 
9 PT Bank Mandiri Banking  2003 (20%), 2004 (10%), 
2011(10%) 
60.0% IPO 
10 PT BRI Banking 2003 (45%) 55.0% IPO 
11 PT PGN Mining 2003 (39%), 2006 (5.31%) 55.3% IPO 
12 PT PP Construction 2004 (49%), 2010 (21.46%) 51.0% EMBO 
13 PT Adhi Karya Construction 2004 (49%) 51.0% EMBO & 
IPO 
14 PT Jasa Marga Service 2007 (30%) 70.0% IPO 
15 PT Wijaya Karya Construction 2007 (31.7%) 68.3% IPO 
Note: IPO: Initial Public Offering, EMBO: Employee Management Buy Out 
Basically we employ similar method of analysis to what has been employed by some previous researches such as 
Boubakri et al (2005) and D’Souza et al (2005). To assess whether partial privatization brings significant impact 
on the performance of divested SOEs we employ univariate non parametric test called Wilcoxon Signed-rank test. 
It is principally done by comparing the mean value of each performance measure in pre and post privatization. 
Meanwhile, to investigate the determining factors of  performance changes found in the first test, we employ 
panel regression. Following Megginson and Netter (2001), we include firm specific as well as environment 
specific factors as predictors of the success or failure of partial privatization. We classify the performance 
measures into 3 categories: profitability (ROS), efficiency (EFFICIENCY), and productivity (EMPROD). 
Furthermore, we use the remaining state ownership (OWNERSHIP), number of government commissioner 
(GOVCMSNR), number of independent commissioner (INDPCOMSNR), composite stock index 
(STOCKINDX), stock turnover (STOCKTURNV) as predictors (independent variables) in the second stage of 
the analysis, where  the log of GDP (LogGDP) is used as control variable for the effect of general 
macroeconomic policy. List of variables used are as described in Table 2. In more detail the panel estimation is 
expressed as follows: 
Performance = α + β1 (residual state share) + β2 (number of government commissioners) + β3 (number of 
independent commissioners) + β4 (Size of capital stock) + β5 (intensity of capital stock transaction) + β6 (Size 
of economy) +µit 
We divide the analysis into two time frames; short term and extended term. Short term analysis, done by 
comparing 3 years before and 4 years after privatization, is aimed at assessing the immediate impact of 
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privatization, while extended period analysis which is to examine the impact of privatization in the long term 
period is done on the entire sample data--data available on pre and post privatization. In the latter analysis we 
use 214 observations in the unbalanced panel regression. 
Table 2. Definitions of explanatory variables used in regressions 
Variable   Proxy for Empirical Definition 
Return on Sales (ROS) Performance of 
SOE--Profitability 
Operating Income divided by Total 
Sales 
Efficiency
5
 
(EFFICIENCY) 
Performance of 
SOE--Efficiency 
Value Added/Capital Employed 
Value Added = Operating Income + 
non Cash Expensed; Capital 
Employed = Working Capital + 
Fixed Assets; Working Capital = 
Current Assets – Current Assets 
Employee Productivity 
(EMPROD) 
Performance of 
SOE--Productivity 
Inflation-Adjusted Operating Income 
divided by Number Employee 
Residual State Share 
(OWNERSHIP) 
Internal firm factor to 
represent newly capital 
structure 
The percentage of residual state share 
(0-100%) 
Government 
Commissioner 
(GOVCMSNR) 
Internal firm factor to 
represent shareholder’s 
supervision 
Number of government 
commissioners on BOC 
Independent 
Commissioner 
(INDPCMSNR) 
Internal firm factor to 
represent size of the SOEs 
Natural logarithm of total assets in 
every year of observation period 
Stock Index 
(STOCKINDEX) 
External firm factor to 
represent size of capital 
market as one indicator of 
the capital market 
efficiency 
An indicator of price stock movement 
of all stock listed in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange.  
Stock Turnover 
(STOCKTURNV) 
External firm factor to 
represent intensity of 
capital market as one 
indicator of the capital 
market efficiency 
Stock turnover is the total value of 
shares traded during the period 
divided by the average market 
capitalization for the period.  
Gross Domestic Product 
(logGDP) 
Size and level activity of 
economy 
Natural logarithm of total GDP data 
taken from world data site 
measured in constant local 
currency (trillion IDR) 
 
4. Empirical Result 
4.1 The Impact of Privatization on Performance of Divested SOEs 
Table 3 shows the result of short term analysis. Generally speaking, the table reveals that there are statistically 
significant positive changes in performance of partially privatized SOEs in the post privatization in comparison 
with the performance in the pre privatization. In the short term the divested SOEs experienced improved 
efficiency and productivity at  5% and 1% significance level respectively. Out of 14, there are 10 and 13 
divested SOEs that demonstrate increased efficiency and productivity respectively. Profitability goes up by 0.063 
on average, while productivity improves by IDR 133 million per employee on average. With regard to 
profitability, out of 14
6
 there are 9 SOEs experiencing increased profitability. However, it is considered 
                                                        
5 For banking industry, efficiency is calculated by using income-based approach (Leightner and Lovell, 1998) which is total 
interest + non-interest income divided by total interest + non-interest expenses. 
6 One SOE is dropped from analysis due to outlier problem which the dropped SOE significantly deviates from general trend 
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statistically insignificant.  
Analysis result of extended period is shown in Table 4. It is revealed that most divested SOEs perform better 
after privatization. The impact of privatization is even more noticeable. Even after including the outlier dropped 
in the short term analysis, all of three performance indicators, including profitability, increase at statistically 
significant level. In comparison with the impact of privatization in the short term, there is significant 
improvement. The mean change of profitability goes up from 0.0248 in the short term to 0.04722 in the extended 
period, while efficiency rises from 0.0626 to 0.0836. Lastly productivity also grows from IDR 134 million to 
IDR 332 million. The  efficient  divested firms also underline the fact. All in all, the result shows that the 
effect of privatization is likely to be positively larger in the long term period. 
4.2 The Determining Factor of The Privatization Success 
As exhibited in Table 5 and Table 6, the panel estimations identify several factors affecting the performance 
enhancement of privatized SOEs. Most of firm specific predictors play significant role in affecting the 
performance of the firm. The difference tends to be more on the level and the trend of the importance. The 
percentage of residual state shares in the divested firms seems to have negative impact on the performance of 
divested firms, especially in the long term period. While in the long term it affects efficiency and profitability at 
5% and 1% significance level respectively, in the short term it significantly affects only the efficiency level at 
5%, but not significant for the profitability and productivity. The favorable influence of the number of 
government commissioners appears to become less critical in the long term since it favorably affects the 
profitability at 1% only but not significant for the efficiency and productivity compared to the impact in the short 
term which affects profitability and productivity positively. In contrast, the role of independent commissioners 
gets stronger in the long term period. Although it affects the same indicators of performance in both period of 
analysis, which are efficiency and profitability, the significance level is stronger in the long period. It rises from 
5% to 1% for efficiency and from 10% to 5% for profitability.  
With respect to the external specific factor, our result demonstrates that the size of transaction in the capital stock, 
which is represented by stock index, also presents positive contribution to the performance improvement after 
privatization particularly in the long term. While in the short term it affects significantly only the productivity at 
1% significance level, the important role of capital stock is even more visible in the long term when profitability 
as well as efficiency is favorably affected by it at 5% and 10% correspondingly. Nevertheless, compared to other 
variables, the magnitude of stock market importance is very marginal. It is shown by its very small coefficient 
(0.0001) for both efficiency and profitability. Lastly, it seems to us that no single variable affects significantly the 
productivity of the firm in the long term.  
 
5. Analysis and Discussion 
5.1 Partial Privatization and Performance of Divested SOEs 
Considering the mainstream theoretical arguments supported by finding from numerous studies which neglects 
the possible success of partial privatization, the finding of this study is very interesting. It is rather contrasted 
with what is reported by several studies on the same issue. Many works such as done by Boubakri et. al, (2005) 
and D’Souza et.al. (2005) conclude that privatization would be effective in bringing performance enhancement if 
it is only done fully by relinquishing control from the state to the private sector. Partial privatization is 
considered unable to eradicate the main problem of political interference. The only possible source of 
performance improvement in the case of partial privatization is the presence of capital market that can bring 
incentive to the manager in the form of takeover threat.  
Apparently, partial privatization in Indonesia is successful in forcing the firms to enhance their efficiency shortly 
after privatization. Of the consequences is some firms are compelled to cut their normal profit. Hence, some 
divested SOEs experience declined profitability shortly after privatization. However, it looks just a matter of 
time for partial privatization to show its favorable impact. In the long term, most divested SOEs demonstrate 
their superiority in all aspects of performance indicators. Unlike the Indian case reported by Gupta (2005), 
Indonesia has not had stock market as well established as India. Theoretically, it would be less likely for 
privatization to be successful. In fact, the privatization is surprisingly successful in Indonesia. There must be 
very interesting reason behind this success.  
5.2 Government Commitment through Effective Monitoring and Proper Incentive 
                                                                                                                                                                             
so that it affects considerably the aggregate result. 
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Under partial privatization, the government as both a majority shareholder and a regulator is the key player in 
making the program successful. In the case of Indonesia, the government of Indonesia seems to use privatization 
as a momentum to show its commitment to improve the performance of divested SOEs. In Indonesia, 
privatization is not a popular policy. The government often gets strong oppositions from the stakeholders 
especially public, politicians, employees, as well as managers. Politically, privatization was considered as selling 
the sovereignty especially during economic crisis when domestic investors had weak purchasing power to buy 
the shares offered. The involvement of IMF and World Bank also caused some people considered privatization as 
a new form of colonization. Nevertheless, the government seemed to have no choices to solve the severe and 
emergent economic problem. Eventually, the government had to take bitter and unpopular decision of 
privatization on the premise that that privatization would bring benefit to stakeholders in general, and enhance 
the performance of the enterprises in particular. Thus, once the decision of privatization has been taken, the 
government has moral obligation and promise to meet. The government pursues its commitment and promise 
through at least two ways: 
5.2.1 Effective Monitoring Mechanism 
The effort of the government to set forth well-established monitoring mechanism can be seen from the following 
actions. Firstly, the government establishes better monitoring institution. Before 1998, supervision and 
monitoring of SOEs were done dispersedly under several Technical Ministries according to their respective 
sectors. One of the IMF conditions in helping Indonesia out of the 1997 crisis was to ask the government to 
restructure and privatize all SOEs in the medium term. To fasten and ease the process of fast-track and full 
privatization as required by IMF, oversight of public enterprise was transferred firstly from the Technical 
Ministries to the Ministry of Finance as stipulated in Government Regulation (PP) No 12 and 13. Later, the 
government decided to transfer oversight task to new ministry called Ministry of SOEs which was responsible 
for restructuring, privatizing as well as monitoring public enterprises after privatization. Centralized oversight is 
deemed to be better in minimizing political interference from bureaucrats and politicians of related ministries. In 
addition, the policy formulating process can be streamlined under separate new ministry. 
Secondly, the government delegates more authorities and power to the Board of Commissioners (BOC).  
Shortly after privatization, the privatized SOEs are obliged by Liability Limited Law to make some adjustments 
in their Article of Association in respond to change in their status. New proposal of Article of Association has to 
be approved by General Shareholder Meeting (GSM), which is the state itself as majority stakeholder. Of main 
changes is about the new role of the Board of Commissioner (BOC). Previously, the role of BOC is just as an 
extended hand of GSM in overseeing operational decision made by Board of Directors (BODs). Almost all 
strategic policies in association with the companies are taken by GSM, and then it would be BOC’s 
responsibility to ensure those decisions to be implemented properly. Through new Article of Association, the 
state usually delegates more authorities to BOC, meanwhile GSM deals with more strategic decisions which 
usually related to the issue of state finance. All of those efforts can prevent political noise caused by politicians 
and bureaucrats so that it could give managers more independence in operating their enterprises while 
minimizing potential rent seeking activities from bad politicians or bureaucrats.  
Thirdly, government enhances the intensity and quality of monitoring by reducing the number of government 
commissioners and allowing independent commissioners in the BOC. Since the government decided to give 
more autonomy by implementing “control by objective”, the government has refrained from intervening in SOEs 
directly at the operational level. As substitute, the government has optimized supervision and monitoring 
function through BOC. Before privatization when SOEs were fully owned by the state, the BOC consisted of 
only government commissioners which were usually appointed from top-ranked bureaucrats or retired officers 
from related ministries. It is also a common practice that some members of the BOC are politicians belong to 
government parties. This highlights the facts that political interference is adversely rampant in the context of 
Indonesian SOEs. 
As regulated in Company Law No. 40, listed firms (including privatized SOEs) may have two categories of 
commissioners in their BOC, namely: delegated commissioners, and independent commissioners. A delegated 
commissioner is usually appointed from parties affiliating to the shareholders. Their presence is to represent the 
shareholders’ interest. Including in this category are government commissioners who represent the state as 
majority shareholders. Meanwhile, an independent commissioner shall be neither appointed from parties 
associating with the main shareholders nor the members of the BOC. As depicted in Table 7, there is an increase 
in the average number of total BOC members of most privatized SOEs in post privatization compared to pre 
privatization. Nonetheless, increasing the number of BOC members can lead to worsening political intervention 
if the new composition of the BOC is dominated by politicians. With its commitment to improve the 
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performance of divested SOEs, government trims down the number of government commissioners in listing 
SOEs as shown by the same table. Theoretically, declined number of government commissioners could lessen of 
the amount of information available to politicians and bureaucrats (Schmidt, 1990), which is in turn would lead 
to less political interference in SOEs. As a result, privatized SOEs would become relatively more independent 
from rent-seeking activities so that it could lead to better performance as advocated by public choice theorists. 
As shown by the result of the regression, the positive contribution of government commissioners which is 
initially noticeable becomes less contributive in the long term. 
The same table reveals that the cause of increased average number of BOC members is the presence of 
independent commissioners. Although it is not obligatory, to enhance credibility and objectivity in the 
monitoring of privatized SOEs, the government through GSM agrees to have independent commissioners in the 
BOC. Independent commissioners are typically persons with expertise in fields related to the SOEs’ business. 
Most of them are economic observers, practitioners, academicians, and so on. With their skills, experience, as 
well as professionalism, and  with no vested interest from any political group, their presence is considered 
important to maintain public trust in the governance of SOEs. The number of independent commissioners on the 
BOC is not determined strictly; rather the government matches with the need in the industry. Another factor 
taken into consideration is the number of shares owned by non-state shareholders, larger number of shares 
owned by private owners, more independent commissioners in BOD will be. To some extent, it can be 
considered as minority interest representatives. 
 
5.2.2 Performance-Aligned Incentive System 
Besides monitoring, incentive is also said by Megginson (2005) as another factor which is absent from public 
enterprises. With multi-layer and complex agency problem, the impact of the absence of adequate incentive 
system is much more severe in public enterprises. It is further argued that the cause of the absence of incentive 
for managers to efficiently utilize all resources available is rivalry among associated ministries/departments in 
defining the objective to be accomplished by managers. What the government did by establishing one-roof 
monitoring ministry is likely to reduce the possibility of ill-defined objectives. In addition, in connection with  
advocates of  the principal-agent problem,  management and employees may have conflicting objectives 
deviating from the objective set by the state as majority shareholders. Of solutions suggested by some scholars 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989) to tackle this problem is by setting proper incentive linked to the performance of the 
firms. As a result, the principal and the agent are likely to have an aligned goal and interest.  
Apparently, the government of Indonesia has realized the problem, even long time before privatization is carried 
out to certain enterprises. It has been common practice that government usually grants bonus to management and 
employees as a form of appreciation for their performance. The amount of bonus has been usually linked to the 
performance of firms in related years. By doing so, it is expected that the employee would have an incentive to 
perform excellently in order to obtain larger annual bonus. Unfortunately, the bonus has not been always granted 
every year. In practice, it is subject to many factors such as need over investment fund in the next year and 
dividend policy imposed by the government to satisfy state budget need. All of those conditions, in turn, would 
diminish the incentive power of annual bonus. Therefore, more definite incentive system is required. 
Alternatively, along with or following privatization the government proposes new incentive system. The system 
is basically stock-based incentive. After going public, stock price is considered as the most representative and the 
most objective performance indicator. Stock price represents all information related to the firm, including current 
and prospective performance, future investment plans, dividend policy, and some other issues related to ethics 
and corporate governance. By relating the incentive to the performance of the stocks it can align the objective of 
both the state as the owner and employees as well as managers as the controller. 
In general, stock-based incentive plan offered by the government of Indonesia to managers and employees of 
privatized SOEs can be classified into two categories, namely: Employee Stock Allocation (ESA) and 
Management Stock Option Plan (MSOP).  
Under ESA plan, the government allocates certain portion of shares issued at Initial Public Offering (IPO) to be 
granted to or purchased by employees and managers under certain condition and certain term of payment. 
Including in this category are Bonus Share Grants and Share Purchase at Discount plan. Under Bonus Grants, the 
government provides annual bonus to the employees and managers as appreciation of their performance not in the 
form of money, rather, in the form of shares. In this case, the employees and managers get shares for free according 
to their take home pay because all cost would be taken from retained earnings or be expended in the firm financial 
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report. To prevent the employees from realizing capital gain shortly after purchasing the stock, the government sets 
a lock-up period varying from 6 months to 3 years. Meanwhile, under Share Purchase Discount plan, the 
employees and managers are allowed to purchase certain number of shares at discounted price or subsidized price. 
In most cases, main part of stock price is paid by using bonus of the employees, while the rest is either being 
shouldered by the firm or paid with employees’ cash. To help and encourage the employees, in some cases the 
firms also give a loan at subsidized interest rate to be used to purchase the stock offered. Similar to Bonus Shares 
Grant, the government also determines certain lock-up period for this plan. 
Another stock-based incentive plan is MSOP which is usually for the managers with certain conditions and 
requirements. Under this scheme of incentive, eligible managers would be allowed to have option to purchase 
stock in the future at predetermined or discounted price.  
 
5.2.3 Remaining Government Ownership and Performance 
The new capital structure of privatized SOEs post privatization is characterized with dispersed ownership among 
individual shareholders. The presence of institutional shareholders in the new shareholder composition of 
divested SOEs is extremely rare. Furthermore, the main objective of individual private investor in purchasing 
stocks is to earn capital gain in the short term rather than to get dividend yield realized in the long term. In this 
respect, it is more likely for the individual shareholders to buy and sell their stock in any time considered more 
advantageous. To make situation worse, the Indonesian capital market, especially in the early stage of 
privatization of being implemented, was less developed in which minority interest right might not be 
well-protected. As a consequence, silent individual shareholders in the sense that each individual shareholder 
might not pay enough attention to what the management does in directing the firm is likely to exist. Hence, 
external governance expected to arise from privatization may have never been realized under these situations as 
reported several studies in other regions (Omran, 2002).  
It is observed that the percentage of residual ownership held by government negatively affect the performance of 
newly privatized SOEs at significant level. One may say that no matter how large the size of share sold through 
privatization as long as it is not followed by transfer of control from the government to private owner it would 
not cause essential change in the way of the firm being managed. Apparently, this is not the case of Indonesia. As 
explained above, the commitment of the government to improve the performance of privatized SOEs through 
delegating more power of GSM to BOC and allowing public monitoring appear to be the rationale of this 
funding. It seems that the government delegates bigger authorities to BOC when the residual state ownership is 
lower, and vice versa.  
At the same time, to represent larger private ownership in the enterprises, the government allows more 
independent commissioners seating in BOC. Those policies show positive impact because political interference 
is likely to be much lower. In addition, the presence of more public monitoring also play role in preventing rent 
seeking activities from bad politicians as well as abuse of power of bureaucrats. As a result, the privatized 
enterprises become more sterilized from any political engagement so that they can operate more as business 
entity rather than as political vehicles. This finding is rather different from what is reported by Boubakri, et al 
(2005) that documents that privatization without control relinquishment by the government may have little 
impact on the SOEs’ performance after privatization in developing countries. In another case as reported by 
D’Souza, et al (2005), residual government ownership is also considered as insignificant factor in determining 
ROS in the study which use privatized firms in developed countries as a sample. 
 
5.2.4  Role of Capital Market 
The finding in this issue supports the theory of privatization, specifically in the case of share issue privatization 
(SIP) that argues that the capital market as external governance can trigger the performance listed firms. Capital 
market is said to have capability in compelling the managers to perform well by posing hostile takeover threat. 
Price stock in the efficient capital market reflects adequately the performance of the managers. Looking at the 
trend of price stock, investors may deem that managers do not perform the job well. Consequently, they might 
sell the shares held to avoid bigger investment loss. In this regard, it is arguable that capital market development 
is one of critical issues in the context of partial privatization in Indonesia. This  is because most privatizations 
in Indonesia have been carried out through capital market (only one of 16 cases in this study used method other 
than SIP). This finding also supports the conclusion of several recent studies (Levine and Zervos, 1998; 
Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1998; La Porta et al., 1997) that document that the intensity of share market, which 
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means also the level of market efficiency, could be judged from size and or the liquidity of capital market.  
As discussed above, the role of stock market in affecting the performance of privatized SOEs is more observable 
in the long term. It might show the pace of development of Indonesian capital market. Since it was liberalized in 
1989 (Boubakri et. al. 2005), Indonesian stock market has greatly developed year by year. In addition to the 
increased number of listed firms, it has also been indicated by larger size of transaction as well as by the level of 
stock market activity. During 1990-1997 the Jakarta Composite Index had always been on the bottom among 
other four neighboring countries: Thailand, Malaysia, Philippine, and Singapore. In year 2010 when the index 
reached 3,703, and took over Singapore’s position, Indonesian Stock Market had ranked second in the region, 
just below Philippine Stock Market on the top. According to Arianto (1996), Indonesian stock exchange (before 
year 2000) could be classified into the category of weak form efficiency since there was strong indication that 
the price of stock was influenced by the information of the price and its movement in the preceding periods. It 
seems to be true that stock index is one of the indicators of capital market efficiency. Consequently, the more 
efficient the stock market, the more pressure posed to discipline the managers. As a result, the listing SOEs 
become more profitable and more efficient in the long term along with the increased efficiency of the capital 
market. 
Despite its significance in affecting the performance of SOEs, especially in the long term, the size of capital 
market impact is considerably marginal in comparison with other variables such as number of independent 
commissioners. For example, for every 1 point increase in stock index it would contribute to an increase in 
profitability and productivity only by 0.0001. In broader sense, it can be said that to enhance the performance of 
the firms, betterment of internal factors should be first priority.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Mainstream existing theoretical and empirical studies reveal that partial privatization is less likely to bring about 
significant impact on the performance of privatized SOEs. Theoretically, with the control still in the hands  of 
the government, partial privatization would lead to an unresolved  problem of political interference. The only 
potential source for privatized SOEs to improve is market discipline from the stock market. Is not it possible for 
partial privatization, even with less developed capital market, to produce significant positive impact on the 
performance of privatized SOEs? Using 214 sample observation from all Indonesian SOEs (15 firms) that have 
been partially privatized from year 1991 to 2007, the research employs Wilcoxon signed-rank test to assess the 
impact of partial privatization on the performance and uses panel regression to investigate the factors affecting 
the success or failure of privatization.  
Interestingly, the results of Wilcoxon Signed-rank test reveal that partial privatization brings about significantly 
positive impact on all performance measures both in the short term and long term. Partial privatization appears to 
compel the firms to cut their normal profit. Hence, some divested SOEs experienced declined profitability 
shortly after privatization. However, in the long term most of them are able to regain their economic profit. 
Further analysis by using panel regression shows that some factors play very critical role in making privatization 
successful. From the internal firms, the remaining state share negatively affects the performance. Moreover, 
while the positive impact of government commissioners tends to decrease, in contrast the positive effect of 
independent commissioner tends to rise. From outside the firm, although the contribution is relatively marginal 
compared to the contribution of other factors, size of transaction in capital seems to provide favorable impact on  
performance in the long term. The magnitude of the impact seems to be in line with the stage of capital stock 
development. 
Uneasy process of privatization in which there is so much resistance from stakeholders, politically and socially, 
forces the government to implement privatization with more commitment and moral obligation to prove that 
partial privatization can produce positive impact to the stakeholders. To improve the performance of privatized 
SOEs, the government takes two main actions: establishing better and proper monitoring, and launching 
adequate incentive plan. Proper monitoring is carried out through establishing centralized and independent 
monitoring ministry, reducing the number of government commissioners, delegating more authorities to the BOC, 
and allowing public monitoring to take place. Meanwhile, adequate performance-aligned incentive system can be 
mainly pursued through Employee Stock Option and Management Stock Option Plan. 
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Table 3: The Result of Privatization Impact Analysis in the Short Term 
Independent 
Variable 
N 
Mean Pre 
 
Mean Post 
 
Mean 
Change 
 
Z statistic for 
difference in 
means  
(post – pre) 
Ratio of firms with 
positive change 
over the firm with 
negative change 
Profitability 
Return on Sales 
14 0.2139 0.2387 0.0248 1.099 9  : 5 
Efficiency 
Value added/Capital Employed 
14 0.4608 0.5234 0.0626 1.601** 10 : 4 
Productivity 
Real Operating Income/Employee 
14 86.9222 220.8816 133.9593 3.233* 13 : 1 
Note:  Significant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***) levels 
Table 4: The Result of Privatization Impact Analysis in the Long Term 
Independent 
Variable 
N 
Mean 
Pre 
 
Mean 
Post 
 
Mean 
Chang
e 
 
Z statistic for 
difference in 
means  
(post – pre) 
Ratio of firms with 
positive change 
over the firm 
with negative 
change 
Profitability 
Return on Sales 
15 0.1562 0.2035 0.04722 2.158** 13  : 2 
Efficiency 
Value added/Capital Employed 
15 0.4620 0.5456 0.0836 
 
1.931** 12 : 3 
Productivity 
Real Operating 
Income/Employee 
15 81.6575 413.7529 332.0954 3.233* 13 : 2 
Note:  Significant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***) levels 
Table 5: The Result of Determining Factor of Privatization Success in The Short Term 
Independent  
Variable 
Dependent Variable 
Efficiency  Profitability  Productivity 
OWNERSHIP -0.2679  (-1.78)** -0.0693 (-0.46) -152.7677   (-1.22) 
GOVCMSNR 0.0139   (0.43) 0.0660  (2.39)* 44.6243      (1.67)*** 
INDPCOMSNR 0.0558   (2.22)** 0.0456   (1.72)*** 0.6950        (0.03) 
STOCKINDX 0.0001   (0.16) 0.0001   (1.45) 0.1118         (3.81)* 
STOCKTURNV -0.0207  (-0.26) 0.2746   (2.81)* -12.7326     (-0.19) 
LOGGDP -0.0987  (-2.01)** -0.5788  (-3.12)* 156.0913     (0.84) 
CONS 0.8082   (3.45) 0.0447  (0.20) -58.0169     (-0.25) 
    
R-sq 0.095 0.312 0.272 
No. Obs 98 98 98 
No. of Group 14 14 14 
F (Prob > F) 24.82 / 0.004 23.74/0.000 68.57/0.000 
Note:  Significant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***) levels 
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Table 6: The Result of Determining Factor of Privatization Success in The Long Term 
Independent  
Variable 
Dependent Variable 
Efficiency  Profitability  Productivity 
OWNERSHIP -0.2255  (-2.02)** -0.2239 (-4.06)* -7.8910     (-0.30) 
GOVCMSNR 0.0183   (1.10) 0.0272  (3.28)* 2.1616      (0.50) 
INDPCOMSNR 0.0445   (2.68)* 0.0155   (1.89)** -6.5037     (-1.58) 
STOCKINDX 0.0001   (2.14)** 0.0001   (1.79)*** 0.0045      (0.74) 
STOCKTURNV -0.0632  (1.07) 0.0588   (2.81)** 3.9985      (0.22) 
LOGGDP -0.1926  (-1.42) -0.1318  (-1.95)** 28.9851    (0.80) 
CONS 1.9024   (1.86) 1.1680  (2.30) -128.5371 (-0.48) 
    
R-sq 0.095 0.241 0.029 
No. Obs 98 214 214 
No. of Group 14 15 15 
F (Prob > F) 24.82 / 0.004 47.42/0.000 7.34/0.2904 
Note:  Significant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***) levels 
Table 7 Composition of Commissioner 
NO SOEs 
Government Independent Total 
Mean Mean Mean 
Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change 
1 PT Adhi Karya 4.00 3.14 -0.86 0.00 1.71 1.71 4.00 4.86 0.86 
2 PT ANTAM 4.00 3.57 -0.43 0.00 1.21 1.21 4.00 4.79 0.79 
3 PT Bank Mandiri 4.00 2.75 -1.25 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 6.75 2.75 
4 PT  BNI 3.00 3.08 0.08 0.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 6.08 3.08 
5 PT BRI 4.00 2.75 -1.25 0.00 3.75 3.75 4.00 6.50 2.50 
6 PT Indo Farma 5.00 3.10 -1.90 0.00 0.50 0.50 5.00 3.60 -1.40 
7 PT Jasa Marga 5.00 4.00 -1.00 0.00 2.50 2.50 5.00 6.50 1.50 
8 PT Kimia Farma 4.00 2.10 -1.90 0.00 1.90 1.90 4.00 4.00 0.00 
9 PT PP 4.00 3.14 -0.86 0.00 0.43 0.43 4.00 3.57 -0.43 
10 PT PGN 5.00 3.63 -1.38 0.00 2.00 2.00 5.00 5.63 0.63 
11 PT PTBA 5.00 3.78 -1.22 0.00 1.78 1.78 5.00 5.56 0.56 
12 PT TELKOM 5.00 3.50 -1.50 0.00 1.50 1.50 5.00 5.00 0.00 
13 PT Timah 3.00 2.25 -0.75 0.00 1.38 1.38 3.00 3.63 0.63 
14 PT WIKA 4.00 3.00 -1.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 1.00 
15 PT Semen Gresik 5.00 3.50 -1.50 0.00 1.75 1.75 5.00 5.25 0.25 
  TOTAL 4.27 3.15 -1.11 0.00 1.96 1.96 4.27 5.11 0.85 
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